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Mission-oriented 
- Do I need to land immediately? 
    or at nearest suitable airport? 
- Can I fly to planned destination? 
What airplane capabilities remain? 
- Is maneuver envelope affected? 
- Are all engines operating? 
- Are there other changes to 
  capabilities? 
Identify 
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Should I take 
system actions? 
Take system actions to 
- mitigate system failures 
- contain system failures 
- restore system functions 
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Objectives 
§  How can we integrate information to better support operational decision 
making?  Can we draw from available sources (airplane, environment, 
infrastructure) and integrate for decision makers? 
§  How can we reduce the burden on the flight crew by changing the tasks 
they need to perform, explicitly 
§  remove the need to translate from physical to operational 
§  remove the need to gather and organize relevant information 
§  What is the potential role for automation in this type of operational 
decision making?  How do we shape Human-Automation teaming for 
this type of operational decision making? 
NOTE: There are a number of NASA Ames projects related to these topics 
Current State of Airplane System Failure Management 
 
Boeing 787, Airbus 380, Bombardier C-Series, Embraer 170/190, Gulfstream G500 
§  The vast majority of non-normal messages are presented in terms of 
airplane system components (e.g., HYD Y ENG PMP A PRESS LO) 
§  Failure messages are presented for single failures 
§  EICAS messages get linked to electronic checklists (except Gulfstream) 
§  Flight crew can, generally, select the NNC they think is most appropriate 
(not on the A380) 
§  Changes to operational limitations are generated from NNCs but not 
integrated (Airbus does a better job here) 
Interesting Items for each Airplane 
Boeing 787 
- easy access to ECL and NNC list 
- some elimination of NNC messages 
 
Airbus 380 
- inability to see the entire set of ECAM messages / NNC and ECL together 
- automatic linking of synoptics 
- more sophisticated handling of operational consequences (landing performance) 
 
Bombardier C-Series 
- more complex displays for listing/accessing checklists 
- some elimination of NNC messages 
 
Embraer 170/190 (1st gen Primus Epic) 
- large area for NNC messages (22 lines) 
 
Gulfstream G500 
- use of “umbrella” messages (hide downstream consequences) 
- no ECL; no display-based ops consequences 
The Problem 
§  Airplane system failures lead to a listing of failed components,         
which leads to one or more NNC messages,                                                     
which leads to system actions (maybe) and                              
statements about changes to operational limitations. 
§  It can be hard to  
§  quickly assess ability to perform mission 
§  see the “big picture” regarding airplane capability 
§  keep track of changes to operational limitations 
§  make well-informed diversion decisions 
§  For the operational decisions that need to be made 
§  some information is missing  
§  some information requires gathering and integrating 
We believe operational decisions can be better supported. 
Focus of Analysis (in 2017) 
from 
Occurrence of airplane system failures 
 
to  
 
Initial decisions regarding compatibility with the current mission 
and  
Overall state of the airplane 
Display Concepts 
§  Mission Compatibility 
§  Airplane Capabilities 
§  Maneuver Envelope 
§  Operational Limitations by Phase of Flight 
§  Mission Risks 
§  Diversion Decision Making 
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Figure 7a.  Compatible with mission 
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Figure 7c.  Loss of options, from information in a NOTAM 
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Mission Compatibility 
-  Range/Endurance 
- Land immediately (or Land 
as soon as possible) 
- Land at nearest suitable 
airport 
- XXXX [airport specifier] 
may be out of range 
-  Landing distance  
-  Approach/Departure/Arrival  
-  Airspace along the route  
-  Airport  
-  Runway 
How compatible are the airplane’s 
current capabilities with the specifics 
of the planned destination  
What is a Capability? 
Airplane System Components 
§ Hydraulic system 
§ Thrust Reverser 
§ Battery 
§ Air conditioning pack 
Airplane Capabilities 
§ Range / Endurance 
§ Stopping Distance (on runway) 
§ Ability to perform a specific approach 
§ Ability to enter RVSM airspace 
§ Maneuver envelope 
Airplane system 
components have failed 
What can I do? 
Where can I go? 
Initial Ideas about Airplane Capabilities 
Can I Take–off? 
Can I reach my planned destination? 
Can I land? 
Envelope 
 
Resources 
Electric Power 
Hydraulic Power 
Pneumatic Power 
Equipment Cooling 
 
Engines (state) 
Navigation 
Communication 
Autoflight 
Surveillance 
Cabin/Cargo Environment 
Ice Protection 
Fire Detection & Extinguishing 
Airspace Access 
Approach Access 
Landing Distance 
Runway Directional Control 
Fuel Supply 
Case 1: Radio Altimeter failure 
There are currently no operational 
limitations 
Enroute to KBFI, in Descent. 
 
NOTAM has indicated that 13R ILS 
is out. 
 
13R RNAV GPS approach was 
selected. 
Case 1: Radio Altimeter failure 
A radio altimeter fails. 
 
“Alerting” on the approach and the 
notification that there have been 
changes to Approach Access. 
Language is “not authorized”. 
 
Other available approaches are 
offered. 
Case 1: Radio Altimeter failure 
Pilot selected the LOC only 
approach. 
 
Everything is fine again. 
Changes to airplane capabilities are 
not really relevant to the new 
mission.  Should they be preserved? 
Case 1: Radio Altimeter failure 
Weather gets worse and LOC only 
approach should NOT be flown. 
 
Divert? 
Pilot must trigger a diversion support 
tool in this case. 
Alternative Design 
Case 2: AC Bus Failure 
Enroute to OKC, in Cruise. 
 
Case 2: AC Bus Failure 
AC Bus Faiure occurs. 
EICAS messages would be 
- AC BUS 1 OFF        
- AUTOTHROT DISC 
- ENG 1 EEC MODE  
- FUEL PUMP 2 
- FUEL PUMP 3 
- WNSHR ALERT SYS 
- GND PROX SYS 
- HEAT L TAT 
- OUTFLOW VLV L 
- HEAT L AOA 
- WINDOW HEAT L 
- HEAT P/S CAPT 
- AUTOBRAKE    
- ELEC UTIL BUS L 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some changes to operational 
limitations have occurred. 
 
Case 2: AC Bus Failure 
Operational limitations are organized 
by phase of flight. 
 
Also, it shows origin of limitation. 
 
Case 2: AC Bus Failure 
New approach selected. 
 
Everything is good. 
 
Case 2: AC Bus Failure 
Again, weather changes 
 
 
 
Qantas A380 Uncontained Engine Failure 
Explosion of Alert Messages 
§ QF 32;  Singapore to Sydney; 469 people 
on board 
§ 4 minutes after Take-off, engine no. 2 
bursts, severely damaging other equipment 
§ 43 ECAM messages in first 60 seconds; 
many additional later 
§ 50 minutes to sort through the non-normal 
checklists (NNCs) 
“It was hard to work out a list of 
what had failed; it was getting to 
be too much to follow.  So we 
inverted our logic: Instead of 
worrying about what failed, I 
said ‘Let’s look at what’s 
working.’”       A380 Captain 
Qantas 32 
 
Lots of stuff going on. 
 
Does this provide a useful overview? 
Contrast to >80 ECAM messages 
that came one at a time. 
 
Design Decisions / Trade-offs 
§  All capabilities vs Those remaining vs Those lost/degraded 
§  All capability information vs Only what is relevant to the mission 
§  Keep EICAS and supplement it vs Replace it (final goal depends on how 
much automation will come to system management) 
§  Rely on estimates from engineering analysis (model-based) vs     
Relying on pilots to reason through the system 
§  Integration vs Elements (Lost capabilities + airport or environmental 
conditions) 
Reasons for Using System Displays (Synoptics) 
§  Identify options for restoring a capability 
§  what is lost 
§  what is available 
  [use simple models to map physical components to airplane capabilities] 
§  Feedback on system actions 
§  containing 
§  restoring 
§  Illustrations of change in airplane capabilities (operational consequences) / 
Systems training 
We stayed away from ideas to support system actions 
What Did We Learn? 
§  Current interfaces (and operational procedures) for managing system 
failures are evolving but are still tied to a language of system components.  
§  We understand it is not simple to generate accurate operational information 
from sensing component failures, BUT someone should be pushing hard to 
figure out what can be done. 
§  Airplane capabilities is just one critical input into operational decision 
making.  Other relevant information is should also be included (weather, 
NOTAMs, flight crew risks . . .) 
§  Pilots would benefit from a more integrated approach to span from system 
failures to diversion decisions. 
§  While we have not been able to perform a large, formal evaluation, informal 
feedback from pilots has been very positive. 
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